Unemployment Insurance Overpayments and Underpayments by Woodbury, Stephen A.
Upjohn Research 
Testimonies Staff Papers and Presentations 
6-11-2002 
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments and Underpayments 
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute, woodbury@upjohn.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/testimonies 
Citation 
Woodbury, Stephen A. "Unemployment Insurance Overpayments and Underpayments." In Unemployment 
Fraud and Abuse, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, June 11, 2002. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Serial No. 107–82. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments and Underpayments1 
Stephen A. Woodbury2 
The integrity of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system has three aspects: 
whether workers, fraudulently or otherwise, receive more benefits than they are 
entitled to under the law, whether workers receive less than they are entitled to 
under the law, and whether employers pay the taxes that they are obligated to pay 
under the law (Skrable 1999). 
UI overpayments have been tracked by the Labor Department since 1987 with 
the Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program. As a result, much is known 
about overpayment of UI benefits (see any of the UI PERFORMS Annual Reports 
published by the U.S. Department of Labor; for example, U.S. Department of Labor 
1998, 1999). 
In addition, the Department is now implementing a Denied Claims Accuracy 
(DCA) program to track the extent to which UI claims are incorrectly (or wrongfully) 
denied and therefore result in underpayments. To date, the only information on the 
extent of underpayments from incorrectly denied claims comes from a pilot study 
that the Department conducted with the cooperation of five states in 1997-98 
(Woodbury and Vroman 1999, 2000). 
Regarding employer compliance, the Department appears to have no 
immediate plans to implement a Revenue Quality Control program that would 
track the degree of compliance with the UI payroll tax. However, information on the 
extent of employer compliance does exist from a study conducted in Illinois in 1987 
(Blakemore, Burgess, Low, and St. Louis 1996; Burgess, Blakemore, and Low 1998; 
see below). 
This testimony focuses on findings about the extent of UI overpayments and 
underpayments from the five-state DCA pilot study of 1997-98. Combining the DCA 
pilot data with BAM data from the same states and time period gives a more 
complete picture of UI overpayments and underpayments—and hence of the UI 
program's integrity—than BAM alone can give. 
How the BAM and DCA Programs Work
Under the BAM program, each state randomly samples a predetermined 
number of benefit payments each week (between 9 and 35, depending on the size of 
the state) and investigates each of those payments to determine whether the 
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payment was proper. Investigations are performed by telephone and in-person with 
the claimant, employers, and third parties in order to to determine whether the 
payment complied with the laws and policies of the state. Because BAM randomly 
samples paid claims, the Department can estimate, on an annual basis, total 
overpayments in each state and nationally. 
In addition to giving estimates of overpayments, BAM yields estimates of the 
extent of underpayments made on paid claims. That is, an investigator may find 
that a payment was less than it should have been, and this will be recorded and 
reported. However, BAM has no way of estimating underpayments that result from 
UI claims that should have been paid but where denied. BAM only samples and 
investigates UI payments; no payment exists when a claim is denied. 
The DCA program fills the main gap in the BAM program by drawing and 
investigating random samples of UI claims that were denied. A UI claim can be 
denied for any of three broad reasons:
• The claim may fail to meet the state's monetary eligibility criteria; that is, the 
worker may not have earned enough during roughly the year before claiming 
benefits. This is a monetary denial.
• The claim may fail to meet the state's separation eligibility criteria; that is, the 
worker may have quit or been discharged for cause rather than being laid off 
due to lack of work. This is a separation denial. 
• The claim may fail to meet the state's nonseparation eligibility criteria; that is, 
the worker may not have been able, available, and searching for work during 
the week in question. This is a nonseparation denial. 
Accordingly, in both the DCA Pilot Project of 1997-98 and the DCA program that is 
now starting, states drew (or draw) three separate random samples—one of 
monetary denials, a second of separation denials, and a third of nonseparation 
denials. Each of these is investigated in a manner similar to that used to investigate 
paid claims under BAM, and the correctness of the denial is determined. 
Findings from Five-State Pilot Project 
Table 1 displays UI overpayments and underpayments for 1997-98 in the five 
states that participated in the DCA Pilot Project—Nebraska, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. These are the only states (and the only 
time period) for which data exist on the extent of underpayments caused by incorrect 
denials, in addition to underpayments on paid claims and all types of 
overpayments. 
Column 2 shows that overpayments as a percentage of total UI benefits paid 
2
ranged between 2.2 and 12 percent in the five pilot states, with a weighted average of 
7.2 percent in those states. This is slightly below the national average overpayment 
rate of 8.6 percent. The BAM reports show that the main reasons for these 
overpayments are (1) workers failing to report all or part of their earnings while 
claiming benefits, (2) violations of the separation eligibility criteria, and (3) workers 
failing to search for work as required by state law and policy. 
Column 3 shows that underpayments on paid claims (again as a percentage of 
total UI benefits paid) ranged from 0.5 to 1.2 percent in the five pilot states, with a 
weighted average of 1.0 percent. This was very close to the national average 
underpayment rate of 0.9 percent. 
Column 4 shows that underpayments caused by wrongful denials ranged 
from 1.4 to 9.0 percent of total UI benefits paid in the five pilot states, with a 
weighted average of 3.4 percent. The DCA reports show that wrongful monetary 
denials account for 39 percent of these underpayments, wrongful separation denials 
account for 36 percent, and wrongful nonseparation denials account for 25 percent. 
Also, the underlying causes of underpayments vary with the type of wrongful 
denial: Employer underreporting of wages is the main cause of wrongful monetary 
denials; agency error is the main cause of wrongful separation and nonseparation 
denials. 
How closely the five pilot states resemble the rest of the United States in 
underpayments due to wrongful denials is unknown; however, applying the 
average rate of underpayments caused by wrongful denials to the entire nation 
suggests that benefits lost from wrongful denials during fiscal year 1998 were in 
excess of $635 million. 
Column 5 shows the sum of underpayments on paid claims and 
underpayments from wrongful denials. A comparison of columns 5 and 2 shows 
that in one state (Nebraska) underpayments exceed overpayments. In two (West 
Virginia and Wisconsin) overpayments exceed underpayments by less than 33 
percent. In the remaining two states (New Jersey and South Carolina) overpayments 
exceed underpayments more substantially. In the five pilot states overall, 
overpayments exceed underpayments by about 64 percent; $1.00 of underpayment is 
outmatched by $1.64 of overpayment. This excess of overpayments relative to 
underpayments is substantially less than the picture that emerges if one examines 
only the BAM data, which would suggest that overpayments exceed underpayments 
by 7 times or more. A view of the UI system's integrity that focuses only on paid 
claims (as BAM does) and that neglects the accuracy of denials is quite incomplete. 
Implications
Because the BAM program samples and investigates only paid claims, BAM 
offers an incomplete picture of the extent of the UI program's integrity. In particular, 
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the extent of underpayments cannot be appraised in the BAM program because 
BAM overlooks the correctness of denied UI claims. A denied claim never generates 
a payment, so it cannot be sampled under BAM. In effect, incorrectly denied claims 
slip under BAM's radar. The Labor Department is well aware of this point and is 
implementing the DCA program to fill the gap. 
What can be done to improve the UI program's integrity? The UI system faces 
an obvious dilemma. Decisions must be made on whether to pay benefits to 
millions of UI claimants in a timely manner. Too much concern about 
overpayments is likely to result in states denying benefits to eligible claimants. Too 
much concern about underpayments is likely to result in states paying claimants 
who are in fact ineligible. 
This dilemma notwithstanding, three policies would clearly improve the 
soundness and accuracy of the UI program. First, one of the three main reasons for 
overpayments is a worker's failure to search adequately for work (U.S. Department 
of Labor 1999). It follows that improved monitoring and enforcement of the work 
search test would improve the program's integrity. An obvious and direct approach 
would be to increase the resources available to the states to conduct eligibility review 
interviews. An alternative would be to expand the Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services System (WPRS), which has existed since 1994. There are 
good reasons for enforcing the work search test apart from UI program integrity: 
Available evidence suggests that workers who search more and (as a result) return 
to work sooner improve both their earnings and their likelihood of staying 
employed in the long run (Woodbury 2001). 
Second, the DCA Pilot Project found that the most common reason for 
wrongful monetary denials is employer error—meaning essentially that an 
employer underreported or failed to report a worker's wages (Woodbury and 
Vroman 1999, 2000). Such underreporting has been documented in an extensive 
study involving random audits of Illinois employers (Blakemore, Burgess, Low, and 
St. Louis 1996). That study found that employers underreported the number of 
workers by over 13 percent and underreported UI taxable wages by over 4 percent. 
This represents a significant leakage of revenues from the system. Moreover, such 
underreporting has the effect of increasing the likelihood that workers will be 
wrongfully denied benefits because employer wage reports are the basis of 
determining a worker's monetary eligibility for UI benefits. A feasible and well-
researched approach to mitigating this problem is to implement audits of firms that 
are most likely to be out of compliance with the law, as determined by a statistical 
model (Burgess, Blakemore, and Low 1998). Such a program would require 
resources, but the evidence suggests that those resources would be recovered several 
times over as a result of improved enforcement of the UI tax law. 
Third, the DCA Pilot Project also found that the most common reason for 
wrongful separation and nonseparation denials is agency error—meaning an 
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incorrect decision or action taken by UI personnel (Woodbury and Vroman 1999, 
2000). In conducting the DCA Pilot Project, the project's monitors heard repeatedly 
that it was difficult to attract and retain qualified front-line UI personnel because the 
work is difficult and the financial rewards meager compared with other available 
pursuits. But the accuracy of decisions about UI eligibility hinges on the skills, 
training, and experience of these front-line personnel. If integrity of the UI system is 
to improve, then more must be done to attract and retain qualified and experienced 
personnel. A commitment of additional resources for administering the UI system 
could meet this goal.
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Table 1
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments and Underpayments in the Denied Claims 
Accuracy (DCA) Pilot Project States, 1997-98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total UI              Underpayments (as % of UI paid):             
benefits paid Overpayments on paid from wrongful
State                         ($1,000s)   (as % of UI paid)   claims          denials       Total
Nebraska 42,472 7.1 0.6 9.0 9.6
New Jersey 1,053,409 6.8 1.2 2.5 3.7
South Carolina 164,376 12.0 0.4 4.0 4.4
West Virginia 126,475 2.2 0.5 1.4 1.9
Wisconsin 465,148 7.9 0.8 5.2 6.0
Five-state totala 1,851,879 7.2 1.0 3.4 4.4
U.S. total 18,770,000 8.6 0.9 na na
Sources: Columns 1, 2, and 3 are drawn from U.S. Department of Labor (1998, 1999). Column 4 is drawn 
from Woodbury and Vroman (1999, 2000). Column 5 is the sum of columns 3 and 4. 
Note:
a. The figures in columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 are averages of the five pilot states, weighted by total UI benefits 
paid in each state.
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